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UKRAINIAN POST-LENINIST TRANSFORMATION 
FROM THE WORLD-SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE 
The article aims at analyzing the constellation of domestic and international factors that 
have led Ukrainian transformation efforts to standstill and produced long-term deteriorating 
outcomes for all spheres of society and major segments of population. The paper also questions 
the validity of background assumptions of «transitology» and attempts to evaluate their relevance 
to the analysis of post-Leninist Ukraine socio-political realities. Research strategy employed in 
the paper seeks to combine findings of the world system perspective and state-centered approach 
as well as to invoke classical social and political theory tradition for the analysis of the post-
Leninist socio-political transformation. 
In analyzing Ukraine's prospects of «integration 
into the world community» and «transition to democ­
racy and market» scholars and policy-makers have 
often tended to neglect the complex interplay of do­
mestic and international factors influencing these 
processes and therefore overlooking the vicious cir­
cle in which the post-Leninist societies have found 
themselves. Successful integration of the post-Len­
inist regimes into global world system is considered 
to be a natural outcome of rapid transition to democ­
racy and market but the very transition needs to be 
boosted by already achieved integration into the 
«world community». 
President Kuchma has recently presented a par­
adigm example of misunderstanding coupled with 
intentional misrepresentation of the realities of world 
system workings, while talking about Ukraine's pros­
pects of integration into Europe. In one of his inter­
views Mr. Kuchma has called Ukraine a «young 
European state» [1]. That territory of Ukraine lies in 
Europe is well known and undeniable fact of physi­
cal geography. Unfortunately that does not automat­
ically make Ukraine «European state». The real ques­
tion is whether Ukraine as political community meets 
criteria required for the integration into the Europe 
perceived in cultural, economic, and political terms 
as a crucial part of world system core. 
The world system approach sought to identify 
«the social system in which capitalism had grown as 
a single social system and to study that system as a 
totality. ...The single social system Wallerstein iden­
tified was the capitalist world economy. It was not 
the loose collection of capitalist nation-states dis­
cussed by previous authors, but an economic enti­
ty...» [2]. According to Wallerstein, the world sys­
tem consists of core formed by the developed capi­
talist states which includes Western Europe, North 
America and Japan, periphery which can be defined 
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as underdeveloped areas outside the core exploited 
by the latter, and the semi-periphery — countries 
«that are neither among the most advanced nor the 
clearly peripheral» [3]. Semi-peripheral societies — 
countries like Brazil or South Africa — are engaged 
into the struggle to upgrade their position within 
world system to core status. 
Wallerstein's analysis of the singularity of Rus­
sian empire economic development and modernization 
concluded that Russia with its numerous dependent 
areas — including Ukraine among many others — 
«became a kind of «world economy» of its own... 
...Neither highly developed nor peripheralized, its 
strong state and relative economic autonomy allowed 
it to enter the world system as a semi-periphery and, 
eventually, to challenge capitalist system itself» [4]. 
The former Soviet Union was capable of establish­
ing the «world system of socialism» based upon or­
ganizational and ideological principles completely 
opposite to those of the global capitalism. Thus, the 
collapse of the Leninist system has initially left 
Ukraine outside the world system regardless of its 
role as the founding member of UN. Preservation of 
the initial status of newly independent Ukraine as an 
outsider was undesirable for elites and masses be­
cause of its clear economic, political and ideologi­
cal disadvantages and discomforts rooted in the so­
cial memory of Soviet practices and experiences of 
self-exclusion and manifested by more contemporary 
examples of countries like Iraq, Minhma and North 
Korea. Though reluctantly and inconsistently the ide­
ological choice has been made in favor of joining the 
West or in other words developed world of the cap­
italism. But there is a wide gap between articulation 
of ideological priorities, policy statements, real pol­
icy decisions, and, more importantly, decisions' im­
plementation. 
The core of the modern capitalist system has 
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enjoyed remarkable stability — since its formation 
approximately one hundred years ago it has seen only 
one successfully accomplished attempt to join the 
club of the few chosen — Japan. In this respect it is 
highly significant that Japan's case has routinely 
been referred to as a miracle. 
During first years of Ukrainian independence 
the rejection of the legacies of the Soviet past and 
the desire to join the civilized world — post-Soviet 
rhetorical substitute for the world capitalist system 
core — were dominant attitudes at the level of per-
sonal dispositions and important component of pol-
icy-makers vocabulary. Nevertheless, making a bid 
for the membership in a core was obviously unreal-
istic task given the state of domestic affairs and in-
ternational situation but even obtaining the status of 
periphery or semi-periphery within the world system 
requires successful handling of developmental/trans-
formation task and favorable external conditions 
since country's integration with a world system is 
possible only through existing international institu-
tions usually dominated by system's core. Obvious-
ly that the issues of internal development — inter-
action of the state, political society, civil society, 
economy and sociocultural orientations are of criti-
cal significance for the political and economic inte-
gration into the world of advanced capitalist democ-
racies. 
Abortive Development of the Civil Society 
in Ukraine 
Ukraine is experiencing multi-dimensional trans-
formation which involves different forms of interac-
tion amidst major societal spheres — state, political 
society, civil society, political culture, and economy. 
For some Ukrainian social science the solution of the 
problems emerging in the course of transformation — 
establishment of political, economic and social insti-
tutions of modern mass society and creation of mod-
ern society's system of normative orientations lies in 
the sphere of civil society perceived as a distinct, 
separate entity of Platonic ideas bent. Though ill-
defined, the notion of civil society has become a 
buzzword for Ukrainian scholars. 
For instance, according to Kyiv based sociolo-
gist Yevhen Holovakha the main contradiction of the 
Ukrainian societal development «is a conflict be-
tween obsolete totalitarian structures of administra-
tion and civil society» [5]. At first glance this ap-
proach seems to be congruent with Dahrendorf's idea 
of «civil society as a key» to the understanding of 
the revolutions of 1989 and subsequent events [6]. 
But it is questionable whether Ukraine has develo-
ped network of institutions and corresponding norms, 
values, and attitudes, generally «habits of heart» 
(R. Bellah) that constitute civil society. Moreover, 
antitotalitarian movements that emerged in the to-
talitarian societies of the Leninist type did not 
automatically become liberal-democratic. As Bruce 
Parrot has pointed out «it is important to inquire 
whether all the activists who tenaciously championed 
the concept of civil society as a source of resistance 
to communism have been capable of making a post-
communist transition to tolerance and cooperation 
with groups whose central values and concerns dif-
fer from their own. Put differently, not all dissidents 
and anticommunist groups were liberals» [7]. Sovi-
et anti-totalitarian movements often were acting well 
within the boundaries set up by polarizing discourse 
of Leninism. The same pattern of the birth and dis-
solution of the civil society has been thoroughly dis-
cussed by Korbonski in his analysis of the Polish 
case. Mesmerized by the attractive formula «civil 
society against the state» — coined by Andrew Arato 
to conceptualize events taking place in a totally dif-
ferent setting — Ukrainian social scientists have re-
duced the role of another important institution — the 
state — to the role of main hindrance to the self-reg-
ulating evolution of civil society and market order. 
Such account is obviously self-contradictory and thus 
false — it is assigning to the state a great autonomy 
from the society as far as its reluctance to embark 
on reforms is concerned and simultaneously it is 
denying state's autonomy interpreting it as an «ex-
ecutive committee» — in terms of orthodox Marx-
ism — of powerful corporate and regional interest 
groups. This Manichean approach that mythologiz-
es both the state and civil society attributing to them 
characteristics of absolute evil and absolute good 
respectively fails to grasp the analytical, not onto-
logical, distinctiveness of these spheres and their 
mutual penetration — the condition necessary for 
modern liberal democracy in general and civil soci-
ety in particular. It also falls short in understanding 
the historical dynamics of the civil society and its 
roots in the West. Perhaps it is more productive to 
think of Ukrainian so-called national-democratic 
«struggle for recognition» — in terms of Axel Hon-
neth — as a resistance movement rather than the in-
stitute of proto-civil society. The relationship be-
tween state and (civil) society is never simple, hence 
firstly «there is no single locus of great refusal...» 
[8] and secondly, there is nothing a priori «good» 
about civil society; every individual case has to be 
analyzed in its own terms. In a light of Foucault's 
notion of governmentality «the practices of govern-
ment are... multifarious and concern many kind of 
people.., so that there are several forms of govern-
ment among which the prince's [external] relation to 
his state is only one particular mode...» [9]. Thus 
state and society mutually presuppose each other's 
existence and reflect each other's character. 
Moreover, if Brezhnev's rule created bourgeois 
civil society of nineteenth century type so vividly 
described by Marx — within routinized Leninist 
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political system [10], the Leninist extinction removed 
all constraints from it transforming the society as a 
whole into a loose association of individuals where 
each person «acts simply as aprivate individual (ita­
lics original), treats other man as means, degrades 
himself to the role of a mere mean, and becomes the 
plaything of alien powers» [11]. 
As Axel Honneth's study has convincingly shown 
«the normative idea of a just society is empirically 
confirmed by historical struggles for recognition» 
[12] and requires legally institutionalized relations of 
universal respect for autonomy and dignity of per­
sons as well as networks of organic solidarity and 
shared values. Ralf Dahrendorf in more sociological­
ly oriented interpenetration of this thesis emphasized 
the crucial importance of the public virtues which 
commit individuals to getting along with others as 
necessary condition for the existence of civil socie­
ty and democracy [13]. It is more realistic to see 
Ukrainian society as dominated by private values at 
the expense of public ones. As Ken Jowitt has blunt­
ly put it «in a curious, unintended, and highly con­
sequential way, Leninist rule reinforced many of the 
most salient features of traditional culture through­
out Eastern Europe (the Soviet Union and elsewhe­
re). ...Leninist experience in Eastern Europe (and 
elsewhere) reinforced the exclusive distinction and 
dichotomic antagonism between official and private 
realms. ...Regime-coerced political activity (not par­
ticipation) sustained and heightened the population's 
psychological and political estrangement. At the 
same time, the party could not be everywhere. So 
Leninist parties traded de facto privatization in non-
priority areas for active Party control and penetra­
tion of priority areas. This became particular true 
during the Brezhnev period, when the private ego­
ism — personalism (italics in original) not individ­
ualism — became the major sociocultural reality» 
[14]. In other words, «civil society is more than eco­
nomic and legal sociology; it is political culture (ital­
ics added)» [15]. Ukrainian proto-civil society activ­
ities sought to destroy the Soviet rule but apart from 
ideal interests of national and civil liberation as well 
as cultural revival — ideas shared mostly by intel­
lectuals — the masses' attitudes were shaped by pri­
mitive-rational calculation of material self-interest. 
Regime change and independence were conceived as 
means of improving Ukrainians welfare. The unex­
pected outcome was a transformation of just emerged 
public into masses — «rational» calculation of egois­
tic self-interest based on assumption of unequal eco­
nomic exchange with a «Moscow Centre» which can 
be altered only through achieving political independ­
ence and economic autarky turned out to be a new 
version of old anthropological concept of «limited 
good» [ 16] typical for traditional peasant societies. 
From the point of view of social sciences epis-
temology this desperate search for civil society, lib­
eral orientations, democratic institutions, constituen­
cy for reform has reflected Western scholarly com­
munity of experts on Leninist/post-Leninist societies 
strive to make its subject-matter legitimate and in­
telligible through the application of common politi­
cal science vocabulary and thus underline validity of 
their scientific claims in eyes of those scholars who 
deal with more recognizable realities of liberal re­
gimes. In contemporary Ukraine the universal soli­
darity, sphere of fellow-feeling or Gesellschaft as a 
Gemeinschaft [17] as necessary prerequisite of civil 
society is substituted by «ghetto» political culture 
when any political involvement means «trouble» and 
Hobbesian principle of force and fraud. They remain 
to be dominant type of Ukrainian society discourse. 
Another critically important point for the civil soci­
ety emergence is the presence of Western type citi­
zenry — phenomenon totally foreign to Ukraine's 
past and present where significant segments of pop­
ulation continue to define themselves in terms of 
Soviet «civic» identity. 
The Dynamic of Political Society and State 
Leninist legacy of neopatrimonial structure of 
domination continues to shape the mode of Ukrainian 
state and political society developments. That Ukrain­
ian polity is deprived of major Weberian charac­
teristics of modern state has become a common place 
in the discussion of Ukrainian politics. The adoption 
of the constitution with a strong flavor of the French 
fifth republic under the circumstances of complete 
absence of the French democratic tradition could cre­
ate only short-lasting impression of decisive break­
through in terms of the establishing legal framework 
for state building and political society construction. 
Political society in Ukraine remains fragmented 
and unsteady making Ukrainian political elite a dis­
united one. Ken Jowitt provided — compelling as 
usual — empirical evidence for this argument when 
he wrote soon after the institutional extinction of 
Leninism: «most opposition elites in Eastern Europe 
had minimal insulation from the intrusive punitive 
presence of their Leninist adversaries, minimal famil­
iarity with one another and «politics as vocation», 
and minimal success in bonding with a politically 
loyal social constituency. Only Poland, over almost 
two decades, did a counterelite enjoy a Yenan-like 
protective/ interactive experience; one that produced 
a contentious, but mutually tolerant and intelligible, 
elite that cohered, and even in its current divided and 
divisive state offers Poland something more impor­
tant than either marketization or civil society: an 
«established elite». An «established elite» is one that 
recognizes the legitimate places of all its members 
in the polity despite genuine and deeply felt party, 
policy, and ideological differences; has worked out 
civil and practical modes of interaction; and can 
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identify and organize a sociopolitical constituency in 
a regular manner» [18]. The absence of established 
elites has made impossible the development of po­
litical parties capable of mediating societal interests 
as well as the formulation and implementation of 
public policies through the winning the majority in 
legislature. 
Transitologists often take for granted a reformist 
character of ruling post-Leninist establishment. This 
raises the problem of establishing more or less test­
able criteria for determining «reformist» orientation 
of the given regime's long-term policy goals. 
As a distinguished student of modern organiza­
tions Amitai Etzioni teaches us «the researcher will 
define as the real goals (italics in original) of the 
organization those future states toward which a ma­
jority of the organization's means and the major or­
ganizational commitments of the participants are di­
rected, and which, in cases of conflict with goals 
which are stated (italics in original) but command 
few resources, have clear priority. Sometimes estab­
lishing intimate contact with key participants allows 
the researcher to determine how aware informants 
are of any discrepancy between real and stated goals. 
Generally, however, it is unwise to depend entirely 
on interviews for information on an organization 's 
real goals. An examination of resources and direc­
tion of effort is often a necessary complementary 
research method for obtaining satisfactory results 
(italics added)» [19]. The application of this criteria 
definitely rules out any claim about the reformist 
nature of Ukrainian ruling establishment policy ori­
entation. It also reveals the total irrelevance of claims 
defining Kuchma's present path as «pursuit of reform 
in tacit alliance with important industrial and entre­
preneurial interests» [20], the statement supported 
only by uncritically selected reference to mythical 
improvement of macroeconomic indicators [21]. 
Impersonal practices and norms of modern ra­
tional-legal state have been greatly influenced by the 
experience of ascetic Protestantism because Protes­
tant «sect opposes the charisma of office and insists 
upon «direct democratic administration» by the con­
gregation and upon treating the clerical officials as 
servants of congregation» [22]. Ukrainian state for­
mation has so far born a great resemblance to the 
absolutist Europe's mode of state making as organi­
zed crime [23]. As Ken Jowitt has spelled it out «it 
is not enough to point out that most citizens in lib­
eral capitalist democracies (certainly in the United 
States) themselves fail to vote and are poorly in­
formed about issues and basic premises of democ­
racy. The institutional framework, the practice and 
habits of elites, and the sociocultural constitutions in 
these countries assign critically different meaning to 
events in Western democracies and Eastern Europe­
an countries» [24]. New institutions of Ukrainian 
state and political society attempt to recapitulate 
Western liberal democratic patterns of political or­
ganization and policy choices, but the resemblance 
of structures does not automatically lead to the sim­
ilarity of values and patterns of behavior let alone 
institutions' legitimacy. This pattern of activities is 
far from Weberian procedural rationality of method­
ical acquisition of economic and political resources. 
Moreover, in a light of Weber's distinction be­
tween feudalism and patrimonialism it is more pro­
ductive to think of Ukrainian state in terms of patri­
monial polity: «we shall speak of а.patrimonial state 
(italics original) when the prince organizes his po­
litical power over extrapatrimonial areas and politi­
cal subjects... just like the exercise of his patriarchal 
power...The establishment of a «political» domina­
tion... implies an affiliation of authority regulations 
which differ only in degree and content, not struc­
ture» [25]. This arrangement, contrary to ideal-typ-
ically defined structures of feudalism rests upon the 
«benefice» which is «a life long, not a hereditary, 
remuneration for its holder in exchange for his real 
or presumed services; remuneration is an attribute of 
the office, not of the incumbent» [26]. No doubt that 
Ukrainian state's capacity for autonomous action is 
experiencing institutional constraints, especially in 
comparison with its Soviet predecessor but no less 
important is the absence of psychological determi­
nation to undertake an independent action. The ab­
sence of such a determination correlates with the 
value-normative disorientation of policy-makers, 
caused by the general anomie in Durkhemian sense 
[27]. Despite the deep crisis the state has managed 
to preserve its autonomy — quite different from the 
autonomy of democratic state — vis-a-vis society 
through the mechanism of social production of in­
difference so brilliantly described by Michael Herz-
feld [28]. 
The success of radical reforms and developmen­
tal project in general rests upon the combination of 
activities of developmental state with an exception­
ally high degree of state and public actors interac­
tion. Among features developmental state must pos­
ses are the following: «organizational capacity, state 
autonomy and power vis-a-vis dominant interests, 
and the state's interest in seeking development rath­
er static exploitation economy and society» [29]. 
Developmental state policies long term effectiveness 
and efficiency can only be assured with public ac­
tors participation — through institutions of civil and 
political society — in defining and implementing 
government's agenda. Revival and reinforcement of 
patrimonial structures of domination in contemporary 
Ukraine have reduced democratic procedures to mere 
electoralism deprived of social and economic con­
tent. In a line perfectly coherent with patrimonial 
polity norms state institutions and resources are con-
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stantly employed by incumbent «masters» — under 
Kuchma administration this has become a routine 
practice — for ensuring victory in «democratic» 
elections and automatically providing the regime 
with legitimacy, especially on a world stage. 
Conclusion 
Presented above picture of Ukrainian society 
under the stress of transformation appears to be rath­
er bleak. It is obvious that optimistic view of Ukraine 
as a European country that has decisively chosen a 
path to democracy and market represents either Uto­
pian escape from reality or intentional distortion of 
it by incumbent establishment for pragmatic purposes 
of collective consciousness manipulation. 
It would be extremely unrealistic to expect «great 
transformation» (K. Polanyi) of Ukrainian society to 
happen in a relatively short time span. Ukraine can 
hope only for peripheral status within world system 
and it may take decades to obtain this status given 
the current state of domestic affairs. The situation is 
worsening by the lack of psychological readiness of 
population and ruling establishment to define 
Ukraine's identity as a periphery of more advanced 
world system core but this is the only relevant and 
possible goal Ukraine may reach in a feasible future. 
The only alternative Ukraine can choose is self-ex­
clusion from the world system and defiance of the 
norms established by the core but this is the least 
preferable and advantageous strategy as North Ko­
rean and Iraqi examples demonstrate. Moreover, the 
capitalist core has developed new sophisticated var­
iants of the old stick and carrot policy to deal with 
«outlaws» on a world stage — they can expect oxy­
gen and asphyxiation strategies applied to them and 
therefore face full exclusion form the world system 
with all logical consequences of such decision. 
The external aid is not a reliable underpinning 
for post-Leninist Ukraine recovery given its limited 
scope and ineffective use by the borrower. Students 
of international financial system and its byproduct — 
the new world of debt — point out that the treatment 
or rather neglect of financial needs of post-Leninist 
countries is comparable with a failure to tackle the 
problems related to African debt. Marshall plan for 
Western Europe after the World War II was in equal 
measure economic and political undertaking aiming 
at putting war torn European economies back on 
their feet and preventing the threat of communist 
takeover in France and Italy. «But instead of a Mar­
shal Plan for Eastern Europe, the ex-socialist coun­
tries were given the EBRD, a pathetically small, self-
serving regional development bank with its potential­
ly helping hands tied behind its back. Instead of the 
1990s equivalent of the $13 billion 1940s dollars — 
probably about $130 billion — the EBRD ended up 
merely with some $3.4 billion to lend or guarantee... 
...Instead of a flexible system of counterpart funds 
that could be used for public infrastructure like roads, 
bridges and ports, or to finance industrial re-equip­
ment of municipal housing, the EBRD was bound, 
under orders from the United States, to dedicate 60 
per cent of its loans to private sector... Here was a 
development bank pretending that what was needed 
was a profit-making merchant bank» [30]. 
As far as domestic developments are concerned 
the state could perform the function of the instiga­
tor of radical changes as it was in case of Asian ti­
gers. To attain such a goal the state must be a devel­
opmental one. Ukrainian state does not possess the 
features and capacity of system building regime with 
its effective ability to penetrate the society — dur­
ing Brezhnev period of Leninist regime the party's 
rule was weakened by the encroachments of the tra­
ditionalist framework of interest accommodation fur­
ther undermined by the deconstruction of party-state 
and its replacement by the neopatrimonial polity of 
the soft authoritarian bent. If the society is a scav­
enger one, the state actors are also likely to succumb 
to the influence of rampant corruption. Under these 
conditions developmental state is possible only when 
it employs the extensive use of violence and is pre­
pared to achieve its developmental task at high hu­
man cost (Chile may serve as a classical example) 
or in its more «civilized» version the institutions of 
developmental state in general and its executive 
branch in particular ought to be restricted in their 
actions by publics acting through elaborated institu­
tions of political society. 
One might ask what are the causes and poten­
tial explanations of incumbent regime stability and 
conspicuous absence of civil unrest and large scale 
violence given that population at large is showing no 
trust in state institutions while exhibiting increasing 
dissatisfaction with catastrophically deteriorating life 
standards. This problem resembles the puzzle of the 
Soviet regime stability so vigorously discussed by 
Sovietologists not so long ago. The most plausible 
answer has been suggested by Ken Jowitt: «The So­
viet Union lasted as long as it did, because it disci­
plined (often through terror) most, rewarded many, 
and attracted a strategically loyal few for at least fifty 
of those seventy-four years. Being for a certain pe­
riod totalitarian, and always dictatorial did not pre­
vent the Soviet party from being what is now fash­
ionably referred to as socially «embedded»' [31]. 
Employing the analogous style of reasoning we may 
arrive at the following conclusion — first of all even 
elites in «precarious position do not have to seek 
support from everyone» [32]. Relative stability of 
Ukrainian political arrangement lies in a fact that the 
state has let majority of population struggle for sur­
vival by its own means (within the frameworks of 
virtual and shadow economies), has given many an 
opportunity for self-expression and possibilities for 
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political and/or economic mobility and in a manner 
strikingly akin to its Soviet predecessor has attract­
ed strategically important few. Stability, based upon 
such grounds, cannot hope for having longevity of 
the Soviet Union but it may well become a long term 
pattern of the «development» given the experience 
of numerous African and Latin American countries. 
Perhaps it is more realistic, instead of placing 
great expectations upon the outcomes of Ukraine's 
«transition» to think of the transformation of Ukrain­
ian society in terms of Tilly's big structures and long 
processes which take considerable amount of time — 
decades and hundreds of years — to complete their 
cycle. In this respect the most salient lesson of the 
failure of Leninist regimes is that even decisive break­
through with a traditionalist past of national depend­
ency and «lagging behind» does not have lasting ef­
fect and cannot substitute for painful, slow and non­
linear developments towards modernity and postmo-
dernity which Western societies have gone through. 
If Ukraine is to make a bid for becoming truly 
modern society, it has no alternative but to seek link­
ing itself with a capitalist world system as its periph­
ery. It is uncertain if this project is likely to succeed­
ed given its unpleasant long term economic, social, 
political, and more importantly psychological conse­
quences for the majority of population. It is naive to 
assess Ukrainian ruling establishment ideological 
orientations by discussing its rhetoric of marketiza-
tion, democratization and Europeanization while 
blaming it for the lack of political will to implement 
these misperceived ideological constructions. Tran-
sitologists seem to forget the basic premises of so-
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Кутуєв П. В. 
УКРАЇНСЬКА ПОСТЛЕНІНСЬКА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ 
З ТОЧКУ ЗОРУ СВІТ-СИСТЕМНОГО АНАЛІЗУ 
Стаття прагне проаналізувати констеляцію внутрішніх і міжнародних фак­
торів, що завели зусилля з трансформації українського суспільства у глухий кут 
і призвели до результату, що має руйнівний вплив на всі суспільні сфери та групи 
населення. Стаття також досліджує обґрунтованість основних припущень «тран-
зитології» і намагається оцінити їх релевантність до аналізу соціально-політич­
них реалій постленінської України. Дослідницька стратегія, що застосовується 
у статті, прагне поєднати світ-системну перспективу з підходом, який надає цент­
ральної ваги державі та з класичною соціальною і політичною теорією задля 
аналізу постленінської суспільно-політичної трансформації. 
